Abstract
Introduction
Sincere voting assumes that voters always choose their most preferred candidates or parties. It has been argued in both the formal and empirical literature, however, that voters might not always vote for their most preferred candidates. This is known as tactical (or strategic, sophisticated) voting and refers to voting contrary to one's nominal preferences. Tactical voting, as usually described in the literature, primarily takes place under single-member district plurality electoral systems and takes the form of third-party supporters voting for one of the major parties. The logic of tactical voting, of course, is that of Duverger's law, which states that the supporters of a small party would not 'waste' their votes by voting for their most preferred party (candidate) since it does not have a chance to win under a plurality system with single-member districts. Instead, they vote for the major party that is most acceptable to them and that has a chance of winning (Duverger, 1963) . Since Duverger, ample theoretical literature has shown incentives to vote tactically under different electoral institutions (Riker, 1976 (Riker, , 1982 Tsebelis, 1986; Bowler & Farrell, 1991; Jesse, 1995) . Until now, empirical studies of tactical voting have taken two different paths: the first evaluates whether indeed some voters vote tactically under single-member district plurality electoral institutions (primarily Britain and Canada), and if so, how many of them do? These studies investigate the level of tactical voting for a single election using existing survey data; they have shown that tactical voting does occur, usually at a rate of somewhere between 5% and 10% of the electorate (Fisher, 1973; Curtice & Steed, 1988; Evans & Heath, 1993; Blais & Nadeau, 1996; Alvarez & Nagler, 2000 . For different estimates of the level of tactical voting, see Niemi, Whitten & Franklin, 1992 , 1993 .
The second path taken by empirical studies of tactical voting is the investigation of the causes of tactical voting for a given election. These studies have shown that several individual factors as well as contextual factors within districts affect the level of tactical voting in a given election (Black, 1978; Cain, 1978; Gailbraith & Rae, 1989; Johnston & Pattie, 1991; Bowler & Lanoue, 1992; Lanoue & Bowler, 1992; Blais & Nadeau, 1996; Blais et al., 2001) . Kim and Fording (2001) take yet another approach. Using data from four recent general elections in Britain, they investigate the political impact of tactical voting over a period of time. That is, they assess whether tactical voting has had an impact on the actual distribution of seats within the parliament and eventually the
